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Abstract
Flexible territorial structures are common to a variety of animal populations. When resources are abundant, animals can
maintain relatively fixed territory boundaries. However, if resources decline, animals may have to intrude temporarily into
a neighbour’s territory to secure enough food for survival. Although such intrusions may be necessary, they take time away
from foraging and can lead to costly conflicts, resulting in a behavioural trade-off. Here, we examine this trade-off using
a spatially explicit, energy-based movement model inspired by observations of giant otters. We uncover conditions under
which temporary neighbour intrusions are beneficial. We show that, under certain circumstances, this benefit is sufficient
for allowing territorial groups to survive in perpetuity, when otherwise they would be forced to disperse or die. Our model
also reveals plausible mechanisms behind a variety of observed phenomena, including the emergence of intermediate-sized
territorial groups, territorial fission/fusion dynamics, and the employment of multiple methods for advertising territories
(e.g. vocal and olfactory). Although we focus our modelling on giant otters, the behavioural mechanisms it describes are
quite general, having been observed across a wide range of taxa, including birds, fish and mammals. Our model therefore
serves as a general theoretical test-bed for understanding temporary territory expansion.
Keywords Aggressive behaviour · Giant otters · Movement ecology · Scent-marking · Spatial ecology · Territoriality
Introduction
Many species in the animal kingdom exhibit territoriality,
whereby sub-groups of a population secure areas of space
for exclusive use for themselves, whilst actively excluding
others (Burt 1943; Adams 2001; Potts and Lewis 2014).
The act of conspecific exclusion leads to an emergent
‘agreement’ between adjacent territory owners which may
persist across a season or longer, causing stable spatial
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segregation patterns to form (Lewis and Moorcroft 2006). A
basic life-history requirement for stable territories to emerge
is that they are sufficiently large to sustain the animal’s
foraging needs (Mitchell and Powell 2004). Therefore, as
long as the resource distribution remains roughly constant
over time, there is no need for animals to break this
‘agreement’ and intrude into others’ territories, at least from
a foraging perspective.
However, as seasons shift, the resources within a
territory may change (Winemiller and Jepsen 1998; Zhou
and Fagan 2017). This can leave individuals unable to
sustain themselves by foraging within their territories
(Leuchtenberger et al. 2015). To cope with this, species
employ a variety of different strategies. These include extra-
territorial forays (Evans et al. 2008; Patterson and Messier
2001), attempts to take-over a neighbouring territory (Wirtz
1981; Piper et al. 2000), or extensions of an existing
territory to access greater resources (Roper et al. 1986;
Leuchtenberger et al. 2015).
In this paper, we examine the costs and benefits of pursu-
ing territorial extensions. In particular, we consider scenar-
ios in which long-term marking of territorial boundaries is
temporarily supplemented by a second, more transient mode
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of boundary marking with different costs. We base our anal-
ysis on observations of a specific population of giant otters
(Pteronura brasiliensis), which live in rivers within the
Pantanal, a tropical wetland area of South America. Giant
otters are apex predators that can reach up to 1.8 m long, and
adults can weigh between 20 and 32 kg. They feed mainly
on fish (Duplaix 1980) and each otter can consume up to 4
kg of food per day (Carter and Rosas 1997).
Giant otters live in social groups of around 2 to 20
individuals, formed usually, but not always, by an unrelated
reproductive pair and kin non-reproductive helpers. Each
group maintains a territory along a section of river.
Territories are demarcated by latrines, or other type of
scent marks of a group, at either end (Leuchtenberger et al.
2015). Typically, latrines or scent marks of one group will
abut those of another, leading to a contiguous sequence
of territories along the river (Fig. 1). Such contiguous
territories were observed, for example, in the high-water
season of 2010 (Leuchtenberger et al. 2015).
In ‘times of plenty’, when each non-overlapping territory
is sufficient to sustain the group therein, these territories
remain contiguous with fixed borders. However, in ‘lean
times’, a competition emerges, as one territorial group
seeks to push its borders back, possibly causing the
adjacent group to respond in kind. During these times,
otters make excursions beyond the neighbouring group’s
latrines, often making loud vocalisations to announce their
presence. These excursions give rise to fluctuations in
territorial structure, suggesting otters are able to secure
extra-territorial area for a period of time through vocal cues,
a tactic employed by a variety of territorial species (Adams
2001).
The resulting overlap in space use causes neighbouring
groups to encounter one another. For example, overlapping
territories have been observed in the low-water season of
2009 and high-water season of 2011 (Leuchtenberger et al.
2015). The aggressive nature of these interactions results in
energetic loss (Ribas and Moura˜o 2004; Leuchtenberger and
Moura˜o 2009), which trades-off against the energetic gains
from greater access to forage. We examine the conditions
under which temporary extensions of territories, caused
by vocalisations beyond the latrines, leads to a beneficial
outcome for giant otters. We also quantify the extent of that
benefit in some simple examples.
We use a spatially explicit modelling approach to
assess the trade-off between these costs and benefits. The
aim is to understand the situations in which the use of
temporary territorial extensions will be beneficial to giant
otter survival, and when they would be unnecessary or
detrimental. The model explicitly incorporates movement
and interaction of individuals, building on ideas from
Giuggioli et al. (2011) and Potts et al. (2012). Foraging
is modelled as a persistent random walk within territorial
borders which can shift over time (Giuggioli et al. 2012;
Potts et al. 2012). However, unlike those previous papers,
here, the movement of the borders is not random but
determined by whether or not the individuals have an
energetic need to shift the borders, and so obtain access to a
greater quantity of forage.
In particular, we explore three key questions, namely
(i) how many individuals can a given area sustain without
the need to move territory borders, (ii) to what extent can
temporary territorial extensions improve the existence time
of a group in the area, and (iii) in a competition scenario,
where two adjacent groups need to extend their territories
temporarily to survive, can these extensions increase the co-
existence time between groups (as opposed to the survival
time of a single group out-competing the other)? The
spatially explicit nature of our modelling approach enables
us to link the spatial extent of territorial extensions with
the ability for animal populations to extend their longevity,
which is not possible with non-spatial models.
Although we focus on a population of giant otters, we
intentionally construct a model that should be generally
applicable to a range of territorial animals. To apply our
model to a given population, the key pre-requisites are
that each territorial unit in the population (a) maintains
clearly demarcated borders and (b) occasionally extends its
territory temporarily (e.g. due to seasonal fluctuations in
resource availability). Such features have been observed in
many species, including canids (Messier 1985; Patterson
and Messier 2001), birds (Naguib et al. 2001), fish (Bartels
1984; Craig 1996), and badgers (Evans et al. 1989; Delahay
et al. 2000). Therefore the model and results presented here
have potential for wide application.
Themodel
Our model considers giant otters living in a river that is
relatively narrow compared to its length. Therefore the
model is constructed on a one-dimensional line segment.
This segment is partitioned into territories, each one
containing a single otter group. At each end of each territory
is a set of latrines which the otters mark periodically to
demarcate the border (see Fig. 1).
Occasionally, otters may make excursions beyond their
latrines, using vocalisations (Calls) to advertise their
presence to the neighbouring group. This has the effect
of temporarily extending their territory as far as a Calling
Point, denoted Ci for group i. This gives the group access
to more resources for a period of time. During this time,
we assume the adjacent group takes on a subordinate role,
refusing to pass the calling point and being temporarily
left with a smaller territory (Leuchtenberger et al. 2015).
For the purposes of our analysis, it suffices to model the
Theor Ecol
Fig. 1 Pictorial representation of the model. The river is modelled as
a line, which contains contiguous territories of different otter groups.
Each territory is demarcated by latrines at either end. The top picture
shows an example containing latrines from four otter territories. For
the purposes of this paper, it suffices to focus on the right-hand side
of territory 1 and the left-hand side of territory 2, shown in the bottom
picture. The right-most latrine of group 1 is at position L1 and the left-
most latrine of group 2 at position L2. Although L1 and L2 are shown
as distinct points, territories will typically abut so, in our analysis, we
always have L1 = L2. Group 1 (resp. group 2) may occasionally seek
to extend its territory through making a vocal cue at C1 (resp. C2)
section from the middle of one territory (group 1 in Fig. 1)
to the middle of an adjacent territory (group 2 in Fig. 1),
assuming that the number of otters going out of the model’s
domain is, on average, the same as the number coming in
(similar assumptions have often been made in the literature
on territorial modelling—see e.g. Lewis and Murray 1993;
Potts and Lewis 2016a, b).
When otters are not making trips—either to maintain
latrines (Scenting) or to extend their territories with calls
(Calling)—we assume they are foraging. As such, our
model has three behavioural modes: Foraging, Scenting, and
Calling (Fig. 2).
Each group of otters occupying a territory moves together
as a unit, so we model each group as a single ‘agent’. For
simplicity, we model the group as moving at a fixed speed,
moving a distance of l in a straight line for each time-
step of length τ , where τ represents the natural persistence
in movement of the agent. For giant otters, we do not
have a precise measurement of τ , but observations suggest
Fig. 2 Behavioural states of each otter group and triggers for state
changes. Each group i ∈ {1, 2} can be in one of three states at any time:
Calling, Foraging, or Scenting. Arrows between each pair of states are
labelled to show what triggers the change of state
they tend to swim in the same direction (upstream or
downstream) for around an hour at a time (GM, pers. obs.).
When Foraging, the group performs a bounded persistent
random walk with reflecting boundary conditions, and
fixed persistence time τ (note: this is a discrete-time
simplification of the general definition of a persistent
random walk, where the persistence time can vary about a
characteristic mean time, e.g. Masoliver et al. 1989). This
means that the direction of movement is chosen at random
each time-step (with equal probability of moving right or
left), except when the edge of the territory is reached, at
which point the movement is reflected back from where
the group came. Notice that τ is importantly related to
the biology of the animal, since there will be a natural
persistence in movement due to effort it takes to change
direction (Wilson et al. 2013). Moreover, since persistence
in movement can affect territorial dynamics (Giuggioli
et al. 2012), we would expect the choice of τ to have
consequences for the model output, so cannot be treated as
an arbitrary parameter.
When Scenting, group i (for i = 1 or 2) moves directly
towards the chosen latrine. When group i reaches the end
of the latrine zone, at point Li (see Fig. 1), the latrines are
assumed to be ‘marked’ and the group reverts to Foraging.
Likewise, when Calling, group i moves directly towards the
chosen calling point, Ci . This group then reverts to Foraging
once Ci has been reached. At the point when Ci is reached,
we say that the group has made a territorial call. Note
that Li and Ci need not be integer multiples of l, so the
otter groups will not always end the time-step on an integer
multiple of l (i.e. this is a continuous-space model, not a
lattice model).
Calls are assumed to extend the territory for a fixed time,
tC (which we assume, for convenience, to be an integer
multiple of τ ). Thus, for a time tC after group 1 makes a
territorial call, it will forage within the interval [0, C1] and
group 2 will forage within the interval (C1, L], unless group
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2 makes a Call. Likewise, Group 2 will forage within the
interval [C2, L] for a time tC after it has made a territorial
call, and group 1 within [0, C2), unless group 1 makes a
Call. In any other situation, group 1 forages within the
interval [0, L1] and group 2 within [L2, L]. A group will not
make a repeated call within a time of tC since its last Call.
Each group will also have to maintain its latrine
by switching from Foraging mode to Scenting mode
occasionally. As such, we assume that if a group has not
been in Scenting mode for a time tL(Ni) then it switches
to Scenting (again we assume, for convenience, that tL(Ni)
is an integer multiple of τ ). The function tL(Ni) is a
monotonic increasing function of the group size, Ni , to
model the fact that larger groups are able to leave longer-
lasting scent marks (Kean et al. 2011).
The switch from either Foraging or Scenting to Calling
occurs only when the otter group has a need to extend
its territory to gain access to extra resources. To model
this idea, we use the notion of a group’s Energy, denoted
Ei(t) for group i at time t . When Ei(t) ≤ 0, this
means that the group can no longer survive in its territory,
so members either leave or die-off (at which point in
time the simulation ends). We also let Emax be the
maximum energy that an individual otter can have. Then
the energy of a group changes over time via the following
function
Ei(t + τ) =
{
min{NiEmax, Ei(t)+Ni(alR¯i(t)− Eτ − μEmaxI [t, t + τ ])},when Foraging,
min{NiEmax, Ei(t)+Ni(γ alR¯i(t)− Eτ − μEmaxI [t, t + τ ])}, otherwise.
(1)
Here, Eτ is the energy used for an individual to move and
live for a time-step of length τ (per force this is a linear
function of τ that goes to zero as τ goes to zero), R¯i(t) is
the mean amount of resources (i.e. food) available in the
territory per unit length, γ ∈ [0, 1] is the proportion of
resources up-taken when Scenting or Calling compared to
when Foraging, a ∈ [0, 1] is the conversion of available
resources to energy by each individual, μ is the mean
proportion of the maximum energy lost per individual if the
group interacts with another group, I [t, t + τ ] = 1 if both
groups are in the same spatial location at the same time in
the interval (t, t+τ ] (i.e. they ‘interact’), and I [t, t+τ ] = 0
otherwise. Interactions between otter groups are typically
aggressive and often lead to injuries (Groenendijk et al.
2014; Leuchtenberger et al. 2015; Rosas and De Mattos
2003), so we model this as a significant loss of energy to the
group. Note that these can only happen at the points in time
when one group is going beyond its territory border—i.e.
when it is on a Calling foray.
We assume that R¯i(t) is an increasing function of
territory size, denoted Mi(t), so that the larger the territory,
the more food is available per unit length. We choose the
following functional form for R¯i(t), which is justified in
Supplementary Appendix A.
R¯i(t) = max
{
0,K
[
1 −
d(Ni)
r
l
Mi(t)− l
]}
. (2)
Here, K is the carrying capacity of the river per unit length,
d(Ni) is the proportion of resourced depleted by Ni animals
in time τ (see Supplementary Appendix A), which is an
increasing function of Ni , and r is the resource renewal
factor (see Supplementary Appendix A). The intuitive idea
is that, in a self-renewing resource landscape, the larger the
area that a group of animals has to live in, the more time the
resources spend being renewed rather than depleting, and so
the higher the quantity of the resources (on average) at any
point in space. Supplementary Appendix A demonstrates
mathematically that this intuition makes sense.
Group i will switch from Foraging to Calling if Ei(t) ≤
λNiEmax, for some fixed value λ ∈ [0, 1]. Table 1
gives a list of all the parameters used in the model.
Figure 2 summarises the movement processes in the various
behavioural states, together with the situations that cause
switches to occur between these states.
There are some implicit time-scales in this model worth
emphasising. First, we assume the model is only valid
across a maximum time of a single season, since we are
not explicitly modelling seasonal fluctuations in resource
availability. Furthermore, the model is only valid as long
as the energies, Ei(t), of both groups are above zero,
since once either goes below zero, it leaves the system.
In simulations (described later), we stop the system if the
energy of either group goes below zero, since this indicates
that the group has left the system. In summary, the model
is valid across whichever is the shorter time-period: a single
season (typically around 3 months) or the time until one
group’s energy goes below zero.
Model analysis
We split our analysis into three sections. We begin by
assuming that otters do not use the Calling tactic to enlarge
their territory (No Calling). In “Calling and scenting”, we
relax this assumption for one of the groups, to assess
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Table 1 Glossary of symbols
used in the model Symbol Definition
L Length of spatial domain
τ Time-step duration (persistence time of otter movement)
l Distance moved during a time-step of duration τ
L1 Right-hand side of the latrine area for group 1
L2 Left-hand side of the latrine area for group 2
Ci Calling site of group i (i = 1, 2)
Ni Number of otters in group i
tL(N) Time between trips to the latrine for a group of size N
tC Time for which a territory call remains active
Ei(t) Energy of group i at time t
Emax Maximum energy for an individual otter
Eτ Metabolic cost of an individual moving for a duration τ
R¯i(t) Resources available to group i per unit length at time t
γ Proportion of resources up-taken when Scenting or Calling compared to when
Foraging
a Proportion of available resources converted to energy by each individual
μ Proportion of Emax lost per individual in an inter-group encounter
Mi(t) Length of territory group i at time t
d(N) Resource depletion factor for a group of size N
K Carrying capacity of the environment per unit length
r Resource renewal factor
λ Proportion of maximum energy below which a group will switch to Calling
i Dimensionless parameter i = Li/l
 Dimensionless parameter  = L/l
Ŵi Dimensionless parameter Ŵi = Ci/l
α Dimensionless parameter α = aKl
D(N) Dimensionless parameter D(N) = d(N)/r
TL(N) Dimensionless parameter TL(N) = tL(N)/τ
TC Dimensionless parameter TC = tC/τ
δ If D(N)/N is constant then δ = D(N)/N
ǫ If TL(N)/N is constant then ǫ = TL(N)/N
the benefit of a Calling strategy. “Calling competition”
examines the case where both groups use both Calling and
Scenting.
No Calling
In this section, we examine the conditions under which a
territory will be viable without making Calling trips. We
assume both territories are of equal length, so that L1 =
L − L2, and that they are adjacent but non-overlapping
(L1 = L2) so encounters between otter groups never occur.
Due to the lack of such encounters, it suffices to focus on
group 1. To model the lack of Calling behaviour, we set
λ = 0.
In this situation, it is possible to calculate the energy
gain per time-step per individual, EG, exactly. By intro-
ducing certain dimensionless composite parameters (see
Table 1), we arrive at the following expression (derived in
Supplementary Appendix B)
EG=
α
2TL(N1)+1
(
1−
D(N1)
1−1
)
[γ1+2TL(N1)]−Eτ ,
(3)
which holds as long as the energy level is sufficiently lower
than Emax. If EG ≥ 0 then the otter group is able to survive
in perpetuity, without Calling.
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It is instructive to examine the edge cases, where γ = 1
and γ = 0. When γ = 1, otters are assumed to intake as
much energy from food whilst Scenting as they do when
Foraging. Here
EG(γ = 1) = α
(
1 −
D(N1)
1 − 1
)
− Eτ , (4)
so that, since D(N1) is increasing, there may be a maximum
group size N1 for which EG ≥ 0, but no minimum.
This maximum occurs because there is an upper limit to
how crowded a particular territory can get (i.e. how many
individuals can be sustained by the available resources).
For the case γ = 0, so that otters do not gain any energy
from food whilst Scenting, we have
EG(γ = 0) =
2αTL(N1)
2TL(N1)+1
(
1 −
D(N1)
1 − 1
)
− Eτ . (5)
In this case, becauseD(N1) and TL(N1) are both increasing,
it is possible to have both a minimum and a maximum
possible group size for which EG ≥ 0. This minimum
emerges from a spatially explicit accounting of the costs
and benefits of territory maintenance and exploitation. We
call the set of values of N1 for which EG ≥ 0 the Feasible
Region for group sizes (Fig. 3).
To explore this idea, we examine the case where
TL(N1) = ǫN1 and D(N1) = δN1, so that these are both
linear functions. Here, we see that increasing L1 has the
effect of increasing both the maximum and minimum of
the Feasible Region, so that larger territories both require
more individuals to maintain them and can sustain more
individuals (Fig. 3a,b). Increasing α, the uptake of energy by
the otters from the environment, widens the Feasible Region
(Fig. 3a,c). The parameter δ measures the rate at which each
individual depletes resources. The larger δ is, the narrower
the Feasible Region (Fig. 3a,d). In particular, if δ is too high,
then the Feasible Region may contain no integer values,
meaning that the territory is not viable (e.g. this happens for
L1 = 5, α = 40, δ = 0.8, ǫ = 2, Eτ = 15).
Increasing ǫ, the scent longevity per individual in
the group, also widens the Feasible Region (Fig. 3a,e).
Conversely, a decrease in ǫ narrows the region, eventually
leading to the case where the region contains no integer
values. Finally, increasing Eτ , the energetic cost of living
and moving, has the effect of moving the curve down
(Fig. 3a,f). If Eτ is too high then, as with small ǫ or large δ,
the Feasible Region will vanish.
Calling and scenting
For group sizes outside the Feasible Region (Fig. 3a), if
otters take a pure-Scenting strategy, their energy will tend to
decay over time. If this decay is sufficiently slow, otters may
be able to survive a single ‘lean’ season, where the available
forage is low, and then regain energy during a ‘fat’ season,
if the forage then is sufficient for EG to be greater than zero
(see Eq. 3). However, it may be the case that the decay in
energy is too fast to survive a ‘lean’ season by taking a pure-
Scenting strategy. In this section, we explore whether it is
possible for otters to use Calling as a strategy to extend the
time they are able to survive with fewer resources. Recall
that the model is valid until either the season ends or one of
the groups can no longer survive in the area, whichever is
sooner. Therefore the underlying question (albeit addressed
implicitly rather than explicitly) is whether Calling can
extend the survival time of a group sufficiently so that a
‘lean’ season ends before the group is forced out of the area
due to energy loss.
To analyse this situation, we begin by performing
some approximate analytic calculations to determine the
conditions under which Calling may enable the otter group
to survive longer. We then back these up with simulations.
To simplify our analysis, we assume that group 2 has a
viable territory without needing to temporarily extend their
territory with vocalisations. This means that, at any point
in time, we can have two possible territorial configurations:
(i) group 1’s territory is [0, C1) and group 2’s is (C1, L],
which occurs for a time of tC after a Call is made, or (ii)
group 1’s territory is [0, L1) and group 2’s is (L1, L] =
(L2, L], which is the situation at any other time (recall the
assumption that L1 = L2).
By making certain mean-field assumptions, it is possible
to derive an inequality that approximates the region where
there is some benefit to the group for employing a Calling
strategy (see Supplementary Appendix C). For γ = 0, this
inequality is as follows
TC
[
α
(
1−
D(N1)
Ŵ1 − 1
)
−
2αTL(N1)
2TL(N1)+1
(
1−
D(N1)
1−1
)]
>
μEmax
Ŵ1−2
−2
+
2Ŵ1−1
2
(
1−
D(N1)
1−1
)
2αTL(N1)
2TL(N1)+1
.
(6)
By examining numerically the minimum value of TC at
which this inequality holds (i.e. the value of TC for which
this becomes an equality), we can observe how the various
parameters affect the possibility of a Calling strategy being
beneficial (Fig. 4a, solid lines). In general, the inequality in
Eq. 6 predicts that as the calling point C1 moves deeper into
the foreign territory, so the minimum required longevity of
the calling cue (TC) decreases. (Note, more precisely, that
TC is the call longevity divided by movement persistence
time, τ : see Table 1). However, because the inequality
in Eq. 6 relies on various mean-field assumptions, it is
necessary to perform stochastic simulations to verify its
validity.
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Fig. 3 Regions where a
no-Calling strategy is sufficient
for survival. For each set of
parameter values L1, α, δ, ǫ, Eτ ,
there is a finite set of possible
group sizes that can survive
within a territory without the
need for using a Calling
strategy. This is labelled in each
panel as the Feasible Region.
Panel a plots this for a fixed set
of parameters. Each other panel
shows the effect of changing a
single parameter as follows:
b L1, c α, d δ, e ǫ, f Eτ
Simulations require that we pick particular parameter
values to test. The most interesting cases occur when a pure-
Scenting strategy is insufficient for group survival within
a territory. In such cases, we explore the conditions under
which a Calling strategy will be preferable and how much
benefit an otter group can obtain from such a strategy. For
this exploration, we fix parameter values δ = 0.4, ǫ =
20, Eτ = 15, α = 40, L1 = 5, L2 = 5, L = 10, Emax =
500, μ = 0. We then vary λ, N , C1, and TC , and measure
the time, Tfin(λ, C1, TC), until the energy of group 1 reaches
0.
The value Tfin(λ, C1, TC) can be thought of as the mean
survival time of a group. This follows the model set-
up (The model) that an energy level of zero means that
the individuals in the group leave the territory, either by
dying or moving away from the area. If there is a λ =
λ∗ > 0 such that, when averaged over many simulations,
Tfin(λ∗, C1, TC) > Tfin(0, C1, TC) then we conclude that a
Calling strategy is beneficial compared to a pure-Scenting
strategy. We used 1,000 simulation runs, for each set of
parameter values, to calculate these averages.
As anticipated by Inequality (6), for each value of C1,
there turns out to be a threshold value of TC above which
Calling is beneficial. This threshold TC decreases as C1 is
increased (Fig. 4a), which is also anticipated by Inequality
(6). Yet, the precise rate at which the threshold TC decreases
is rather different in the stochastic simulations than in the
analytic approximation from Inequality (6).
This is not surprising, however, since one of the
stochastic aspects of the model is that an interaction
confers a large loss in energy. Furthermore, once the energy
reaches zero the simulation is stopped. Therefore, if a few
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interactions occur in a row, the simulation ends much earlier
than in the case where otters, by chance, do not interact with
the other group for several Calling trips in a row.
In the cases where Calling improves the ability for the
otters to survive, the extent of this benefit can be quite
pronounced, with certain parameter values showing an
increase in the expected survival time of the group of several
orders of magnitude (Fig. 4b). The greater the call longevity,
the greater the benefit incurred from using a Calling
strategy. Indeed, the sharp increase in the curve C1 = 7
that occurs around TC = 60 indicates that increasing TC
sufficiently may allow otters to survive indefinitely when
C1 is high. Therefore, as long as neighbouring otter groups
are sufficiently intimidated by calls to stay away for a long
time, this strategy could be sufficient to ensure otters survive
a ‘lean’ season where otherwise they might have not.
If we incorporate a penalty for inter-group interactions,
by setting μ = 0.1, then we still see an increase in expected
survival time, sometimes of several orders of magnitude
(Fig. 4c). (Note that even if group 2 can survive within a
subordinated territory, (C1, L], it may still fight a territorial
intrusion as territory size is a display of dominance, so there
may yet be a penalty for inter-group interactions). However,
the increase in survival time is less pronounced than without
such a penalty (compare Panels b and c of Fig. 4). Notice
that when C1 is higher, there is a greater decrease in survival
time asμ is increased. This is because there is a much higher
chance of interactions when C1 is higher. On the other hand,
when C1 is close to L1 = 5, the overlap of territories is
smaller so interactions are less frequent. Hence the penalty
incurred by setting μ higher is only minimal.
We also investigated the benefits of a Calling strategy
when the resources are not uniformly distributed across
each territory. For this, we examined two cases: one where
resources tend to be concentrated towards the centre of
each territory and another where they are concentrated
towards the border between territories (see Supplementary
Appendix D for details). In the former case, the benefits
of a Calling strategy were relatively similar to the case of
uniform resources. However, in the latter case the benefits
of a Calling strategy were much more pronounced even than
in the case of uniform resources (Supplementary Fig. S1).
This suggests that we may be more likely to observe Calling
strategies in situations where resources are concentrated
towards territory borders.
Calling competition
In “Calling and scenting”, we assumed that group 2 can
always survive with a pure-Scenting strategy and so never
makes Calls. In this section, we examine the case where
group 2 is unable to survive if group 1 makes Calls.
Therefore, group 2 is forced to respond in kind by making
Calls to extend its territory. For this, we fix parameter values
δ = 0.4, ǫ = 20, Eτ = 15, α = 40, L1 = 5, L2 =
5, L = 10, Emax = 500, μ = 0, N1 = 9, N2 = 4 (see
Fig. 4 The benefits of employing a Calling strategy. As long as the call
longevity, TC , is sufficiently large, a Calling strategy can enable otter
groups to survive in conditions where a pure-Scenting strategy would
not. In panel a, the solid lines show the analytic prediction of the mini-
mum TC required for a Calling strategy to be beneficial (the minimum
TC such that Inequality 6 holds). The circles give the minimum TC for
which the group’s survival time is greater with Calling than without
(from simulation output). Triangles (resp. squares) show the minimum
TC for which the group’s survival time is more than 1% (resp. 5%)
greater with Calling than without (from simulation output). Panel b
shows the factor, Tfin(λ∗, C1, TC)/Tfin(0, C1, TC) by which a Calling
strategy is able to increase the survival time of a group, for different
values of TC and C1, when N = 9 and μ = 0. Here, λ∗ is the value
of λ that maximises Tfin(λ, C1, TC). If otters are able to push back
their competitors a significant way with Calling, then they can increase
their survival chances by several orders of magnitude. Panel c is the
same as panel b except μ = 0.1, so there is a penalty for inter-group
interactions (note the substantial change in the y-axis scale)
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Supplementary Appendix E for an analysis of the sensitivity
of our results to small changes in these values). Note in
particular that N1 = N2 here. The value of C2 is set so that
the distance between the Calling point and the edge of the
latrine area of each group is the same, i.e.C1−L1 = L2−C2
(recall again that we are assuming L1 = L2 = L/2).
Simulations are run until the energy of either one of the
groups has reached zero. The group that remains is said to
have ‘won’. The group that wins is subsequently able to
survive in perpetuity by making use of the whole domain
[0, L].
In this competitive situation, it can still be beneficial
to employ a Calling strategy (Fig. 5). However, unlike
in “Calling and scenting”, the benefit to both groups of
extending the territory does not increase linearly with C1.
Instead, there is an intermediate length, C1 = 6.5, that
is optimal for increasing co-existence time (the time until
one or other group wins, Fig. 5, left-hand panel). Should
groups attempt to extend their territory beyond this length,
the expected co-existence time lowers. Perhaps part of the
reason for this is that when C1  6.5, group 2 almost always
wins (Fig. 5, right-hand panel). However, for C1  6.5,
there is often a chance of group 1 winning. Therefore the
decline in co-existence time for C1  6.5 may be due to the
energy of group 2 reaching zero faster as C1 increases. This
increased tendency for group 1 to win as C1 is increased
may be due to the fact that group 1 will always be the first
group to extend its territory (since, until group 1 extends,
group 2 has no need to Call). If the extension is made
sufficiently far, group 1 gains the upper hand over group 2
from the outset, allowing it to win. However, if the extension
is too short (i.e. C1  6.5), then no matter how long group 1
is able to maintain the extended territory (i.e. no matter the
size of TC), group 1 almost always ends up losing, which
explains the monotonic appearance of the two left-hand
insets in the left-hand panel of Fig. 5.
Similarly, in the situation described in “Calling and scenting”,
the greatest increase in survival time is conferred by
having λ = 1, so that group 1 is attempting to keep its
territory permanently extended. However, the central panel
of Fig. 5 shows that this is no longer always the case
when adjacent groups are both making territorial Calls. On
the contrary, there is often some intermediate value of λ,
between 0 and 1, which confers the maximal increase in
co-existence time. These intermediate values occur more
frequently for higher TC and C1. In these cases, there is
also more chance of group 1 winning, whereas with lower
TC and C1, group 2 almost always wins (Fig. 5, right-hand
panel).
We also investigated a situation of symmetric compe-
tition, where all the parameters are as above but N2 is
the same size as N1. Here, a Calling strategy was almost
never beneficial for improving the co-existence time of the
groups, and where there was some improvement, it was only
minimal (see Supplementary Fig. S2). This demonstrates
that Calling only works as a strategy if there is sufficient
disparity between the groups, either in terms of group size
or in terms of core territory size.
Discussion
We have constructed a model of moving territorial agents that
demarcate their territory both by long-lasting scent depo-
sitions in fixed latrines and shorter-lasting vocalisations
(which we term ‘Calls’) beyond their latrines. Our model of
each ‘agent’ is based on a single territorial group of giant
otters, but the model structure is quite general and should
be applicable to many other species. The Calling strategy
is high-risk compared to Scenting, due to the possibility of
aggressive encounters. Indeed, our model shows that Call-
ing need not be employed when the area demarcated by
latrines is sufficient for the energetic needs of the group.
This corroborates field observations, where territories are
contiguous and non-overlapping in times when resources
are plentiful (Leuchtenberger et al. 2015).
Because giant otter groups require more energy when
they are larger, there is a maximum size of group that can be
sustained by a given territory when taking a pure-Scenting
strategy. However, larger groups can leave scent deposits
that last for a longer time than smaller groups (Kean et al.
2011). As such, a minimum group size also emerges from
the model (Fig. 3). This leads to a Feasible Region of group
sizes, outside of which giant otter groups cannot survive
in their territory without using a Calling strategy to extend
their territory temporarily.
When Scenting is insufficient for survival, Calling
strategies that temporarily expand a territory can be
remarkably effective, increasing the survival time of a group
by (in theory) up to several orders of magnitude, even when
there is a significant penalty for interactions (Fig. 4c). This
explains why such a strategy is often observed, and confirms
the observations of spatially implicit models regarding the
effectiveness of intrusion strategies (Hinsch and Komdeur
2010). Indeed, our spatially explicit approach goes further
by linking the effectiveness of intrusion to the spatial extent
of the resulting territorial border fluctuations, and hence
the extent to which the resulting utilisation distributions
will overlap when measured over time (Potts et al. 2012).
This supports field observations that show overlapping
territories when there might be less resource available
(Leuchtenberger et al. 2015).
Calling is not a single-fix solution, though. Due to the
increased probability of aggressive interactions, as well as
the likelihood that adjacent groups will respond by making
Calling trips of their own, Calling can fail to increase
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Fig. 5 Both groups employ a Calling strategy. Here, group 1 cannot
survive without a Calling strategy, as long as group 2 is present. How-
ever, if group 1 extends its territory by Calling then group 2 will need
to employ a Calling strategy in return. The left-hand panel shows the
maximum factor by which a Calling strategy can increase the time
during which both groups can co-exist, dependent on the position of
the Calling point, C1. At C1 = 6.5, the increase in co-existence time
is maximised. The central panel shows the values of λ for which the
co-existence time is maximised, for various values of TC and C1. The
simulation output is given by dots (C1 = 5.5), crosses (C1 = 6), tri-
angles (C1 = 6.5) and squares (C1 = 7). Respective best-fit lines are
also shown (see figure legend). The right-hand panel shows the pro-
portion of simulations where group 1 not only increases its survival
time, but actually wins by out-competing and eliminating group 2, as
a function of TC and C1
group longevity or even be detrimental to survival. In these
situations, one group will eventually be forced to leave the
area (through death or dispersal). The other group may then
stand a better chance of survival by making use of the
combined length of both the former territories. This latter
group ultimately ‘wins’ the competition for resources.
In these competitive situations, the spatial nature of
the modelling reveals a surprising non-monotonicity in the
relationship between the location of the calling point and
the ability for two competing groups to co-exist (Fig. 5).
A small amount of territorial extension will mean that
one group will die out quickly, typically the group that
is unable to survive using a pure-Scenting strategy (group
1 in our example). A better strategy for group 1 appears
to be to attempt a large territorial extension, which can
result in it overpowering group 2 rapidly (right-hand panel,
Fig. 5), thus also leading to a lower mean co-existence
time. However, an intermediate distance means that group 1
can extend its survival time for a comparatively long time,
without forcing group 2 out of the region.
Although it is clear that this intermediate distance is
better for the population collectively, what constitutes the
most beneficial strategy for an individual group (which is
what we are more likely to see in reality) remains an open
question. Answering this would require a game-theoretic
analysis, whereby each group varies the distance at which
it seeks to extend its territories, in response to the other’s
Calling forays. Whilst beyond the scope of the present
paper, our model and results provide a theoretical basis for
such analysis. We therefore hope to make this the subject
of future work. Such game-theoretic explorations could also
incorporate factors that have not been explicitly modelled
here, such as a link between the group size and both the
Call longevity (TC) and the length of the foray (derived from
C1 and C2). In general, many extensions to the model are
possible (e.g. into oxbow-lakes or other water-bodies that
have different geometries to a narrow river). The aim of the
present manuscript is to provide a solid basis on which these
can be built, one at a time, to understand the effect of each
on the spatial population dynamics.
A variety of papers discuss territoriality from a game-
theoretic perspective but do not explicitly model the
movement of animals. A possible fruitful avenue of
research would be to incorporate these into our movement-
and-interaction framework. For example, Pereira et al.
(2002) examine the division of space that emerges
from a negotiation between neighbours who may be
asymmetric in defence abilities. Mesterton-Gibbons and
Adams (2003) analyse territorial conflict when groups have
imperfect information about their neighbours and resolve
disputes by making use of fixed landmarks to demarcate
territory borders. Adler and Gordon (2003) examine the
territories that emerge from optimizing a model of resource
availability, information, and neighbour behaviour, with
specific application to ants. We have already mentioned the
study of Hinsch and Komdeur (2010), which is closest to
ours in the questions it asks, but its spatially implicit nature
means that it is more limited in the range of answers it
can provide. All of these may benefit from analysis within
a movement framework, both to verify their predictions in
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a situation slightly closer to reality, and to examine any
further results that can be obtained by modelling movement
capabilities.
Furthermore, extensions may be made to our model
to make the role of scenting in territorial defense more
explicit. At the moment, the latrines are assumed to deter
neighbouring groups in a pre-defined way, and it is also
always assumed that these latrines will be regularly ‘topped-
up’ so their ability to deter does not change over time. In
reality, it may be the case that fresher scent cues in the
latrines are a bigger deterrence to neighbouring groups,
so may make them either less likely to perform an extra-
territorial foray, or to perform a foray of a shorter distance.
Modelling such a feature would explicitly tie in the values
of Ci to the time, TL(N), between latrine trips, so may be
an interesting extension for future work.
As well as using Calling as a strategy for survival
when food levels are low, our results also indicate that
survival may be achieved by group fission/fusion events. For
example, the Feasible Region in Fig. 3e suggests the group
size, N , must be between 1 and 6 (inclusive). Hence, if a
group of size 4 is adjacent to a group of size 8 then the
latter group could not survive (given all the parameters from
Fig. 3e). Yet, if two individuals leave from the larger group
moved into the smaller then both groups would survive.
Membership exchange is known to occur among giant otters
(Groenendijk et al. 2015; Ribas et al. 2016), and adult
helpers can leave their parental groups to become solitary
transients or form groups of non-breeding transient otters,
which have not obtained a territory yet (Groenendijk et al.
2014; Ribas et al. 2016). However, this situation is not the
case for the parameters examined in “Calling competition”,
where N1 = 9, N2 = 4 and other parameters are as in
Fig. 3e. In this case, swapping groups is not a beneficial
strategy but Calling can be.
Territorial invasions are very tense moments for otters,
and invaders spend a substantial fraction of their time in
the neighbours’ territory engaged in Calling and Scenting
as they attempt to extend their territory. We have simplified
this process somewhat to focus on the potential benefits
of Calling during the territorial extension. Nevertheless,
our approach captures the key element that intruders risk
energy losses not just from hostile interactions with their
neighbours but costs that arise from lost opportunities when
they are in behavioural modes other than Foraging.
Calling strategies that facilitate temporary intrusions
into another group’s territory may be especially important
when resources are concentrated towards territory borders
(see Supplementary Appendix D). This result thus links
conceptually with earlier results demonstrating that the
interplay between territorial predators may actually cause
prey to concentrate at the boundaries of territories (Lewis
and Murray 1993). In such contexts, two modes of
communication between predator groups (long-lived scent
marks and transient calls) may work synergistically to
enhance access to concentrated prey resources.
Territorial extensions have been studied previously in
slightly different contexts. Tao et al. (2016) describe a
model of territorial animals who have a specific central
place around which they are localised, such as a den or nest
site. In this model, rather than having clearly demarcated
borders like giant otters, the space use decays exponentially
from the central place. The rate of decay, and hence the
home range size, is determined by a trade-off between
defending the territory by staying closer to the central place
and exploring more widely to extend the territory.
However, the lack of clearly defined borders in the
model of Tao et al. (2016) makes it insufficient for the
sort of analysis performed here. More generally, advection-
diffusion models rely on smooth functional forms so
modelling sharp borders requires imposing them directly
(Potts et al. 2012). Here, we make such an imposition,
assuming that foraging otters are constrained to move
within their borders. That said, the model of Tao et al.
(2016) appears well-suited to populations where territorial
borders do not have such a precise location, and particularly
where the localisation of animals is largely driven by the
existence of a central site of interest. The review by Potts
and Lewis (2014) compares advection-diffusion approaches
with models that explicitly incorporate sharp (but possibly
moving) borders, in more generality.
In summary, our model gives plausible movement and
interaction mechanisms that explain a variety of observed
phenomena, including (a) the existence of overlapping
and non-overlapping home ranges under different resource
conditions, (b) the correlation between overlap, resource
abundance, and extra-territorial vocalisations, (c) groups
being of an intermediate size and (d) group fission/fusion
events. It therefore serves as a test-bed for understanding
when and why territorial animals will seek to extend their
territory, as well as making predictions about the survival of
populations should their food abundance change.
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